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RECORDING AND REGISTRATION STATUTES '
Statute of 7 Anne Ch. 20 (1709)
An act for the publick registring of deeds, conveyances,
and wills, and other incumbrances which shall be made of,
or that may affect any honors, manors, lands, tenements,
or hereditaments, within the county of Middlesex, after the
twenty-ninth day of September, one thousand seven hun-
dred and nine.
Whereas by the different and secret ways of conveying
lands, tenements, and hereditaments, such as are ill disposed
have it in their power to commit frauds, and frequently do
so, by means whereof several persons (who through many
years industry in their trades and employments, and by great
frugality, have been enabled to purchase lands, or to lend
monies on land security) have been undone in their pur-
chases and mortgages, by prior and secret conveyances, and
fraudulent incumbrances, and not only themselves, but their
whole families thereby utterly ruined: for remedy whereof,
may it please your most excellent Majesty (at the humble
request of the justices of the peace, gentlemen, and free-
holders of the county of Middlesex) that it may be enacted,
and that it be enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majes-
ty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual
and temporal, and commons in this present parliament as-
1 See: J. H. Beale, The Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America,
19 Green Bag 335; R. W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mich.
Law Rev. 405; Percy Bordwell, Recording of Instruments Affecting Land, 2
Iowa Law Bul. 51, 109, 169,- 3 Iowa Law Bul. 25.
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sembled, and by the authority of the same, That a memorial
of all deeds and conveyances, which from and after the
twenty-ninth day of September, in the year of our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and nine, shall be made and
executed, and of all wills and devises in writing made or to
be made and published, where the devisor or testatrix shall
die after the said twenty-ninth day of September, of or
concerning, and whereby any honors, manors, lands, tene-
ments, or hereditaments in the said county, may be in any
way affected in law or equity, may be registered in such
manner as is hereafter directed; and that every such deed
or conveyance that shall at any time after the said twenty-
ninth day of September, be made and executed, shall be
adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent pur-
chaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless such
memorial thereof be registered as by this act is directed,
before the registering of the memorial of the deed or con-
veyance under which such subsequent purchaser or mort-
gagee shall claim; and that every such devise by will shall
be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, unless
a memorial of such will be registered at such times and in
such manner as is hereinafter directed. ...
Civil Code of California (Deering, 1929)
Section 1213. Every conveyance of real property ac-
knowledged or proved and certified and recorded as pre-
scribed by law from the time it is filed with the recorder for
record is constructive notice of the contents thereof to sub-
sequent purchasers and mortgagees; and a certified copy of
any such recorded conveyance may be recorded in any other
county and when so recorded the record thereof shall have
the same force and effect as though it was of the original
conveyance and where such original conveyance has been
recorded in any county wherein the property therein men-
tioned is not situated a certified copy of such recorded con-
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veyance may be recorded in the county where such property
is situated with the same force and effect as if the original
conveyance had been recorded in such county.
Section 1214. Every conveyance of real property, other
than a lease not exceeding one year, is void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property,
or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded, and as
against any judgment affecting the title, unless such con-
veyance shall have been duly recorded prior to the record
of notice of action.
Section 1215. The term "conveyance," as used in sec-
tions twelve hundred and thirteen and twelve hundred and
fourteen, embraces every instrument in writing by which any
estate or interest in real property is created, aliened, mort-
gaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to any real
property may be affected, except wills.
Section 1217. An unrecorded instrument is valid as be-
tween the parties thereto and those who have notice thereof.
Section 1170. An instrument is deemed to be recorded
when, being duly acknowledged or proved and certified, it
is deposited in the recorder's office, with the proper officer,
for record.
Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes (1929)
Chapter 30, section 31. All deeds, mortgages and other
instruments of writing which are authorized to be recorded,
shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of
the filing the same for record, and not before, as to all cred-
itors and subsequent purchasers, without notice; and all
such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to
all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice,
until the same shall be filed for record.
Chapter 30, section 32. Deeds, mortgages and other in-
struments of writing relating to real estate shall be. deemed,
from the time of being filed for record, notice to subsequent
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purchasers and creditors, though not acknowledged or proved
according to law; but the same shall not be read in evidence,
unless their execution be proved in manner required by the
rules of evidence applicable to such writings so as to supply
the defects of such acknowledgment or proof.
Annotated Indiana Statutes (Burns, 1926)
Section 13390. No conveyance of any real estate in fee
simple or for life or of any future estate, and no lease for
more than three years from the making thereof, shall be
valid and effectual against any person other than the grantor,
his heirs and devisees, and persons having notice thereof,
unless it is made by a deed recorded within the time and
in the manner provided in this act.
Section 13391. Every conveyance or mortgage of lands
or of any interest therein, and every lease for more than
three years, shall be recorded in the recorder's office of the
county where such lands shall be situated; and every such
conveyance, mortgage or lease shall take priority according
to the time of the filing thereof, and such conveyance, mort-
gage or lease shall be fraudulent and void as against any
subsequent purchaser, lessee or mortgagee in good faith and
for a valuable consideration, having his deed, mortgage or
lease first recorded.
Section 13393. When a deed purports to contain an ab-
solute conveyance of any estate in lands, but is made, or
intended to be made, defeasible by force of a deed of de-
feasance, bond or other instrument for that purpose, the
original conveyance shall not thereby be defeated or affected
as against any person other than the maker of the defea-
sance, or his heirs or devisees or persons having actual notice
thereof, unless the instrument of defeasance shall have been
recorded, according to law, within ninety days after the
date of said deed.
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Code of Iowa (1927)
Section 10105. No instrument affecting real estate is of
any validity against subsequent purchasers for a valuable
consideration, without notice, unless filed in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the same lies, as herein-
after provided.
Section 10106. It shall not be deemed lawfully recorded,
unless it has been previously acknowledged or proved in the
manner prescribed in this chapter, except that affidavits need
not be thus acknowledged.
General Laws of Massachusetts (1921)
Chapter 183, section 4. A conveyance of an estate in fee.
simple, fee tail or for life, or a lease for more than seven
years from the making thereof, shall not be valid as against
any person, except the grantor or lessor, his heirs and de-
visees and persons having actual notice of it, unless it, or
an office copy as provided in section thirteen of chapter
thirty-six, is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county
or district in which the land to which it relates lies.
Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York (1923)
Chapter 51, section 290. 1. The term "property," as
used in this article, includes lands, tenements and heredita-
ments and chattels real, except a lease for a term not ex-
ceeding three years.
2. The term "purchaser" includes every person to whom
any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a
valuable consideration, and every assignee of a mortgage,
lease or other conditional estate.
3. The term "conveyance" includes every written instru-
ment, by which any estate or interest in real property is
created, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the
title to any real property may be affected, including an in-
strument in execution of a power, although the power be
one in revocation only, and an instrument postponing or sub-
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ordinating a mortgage lien; except a will, a lease for a term
not exceeding three years, an executory contract for the
sale or purchase of lands, and an instrument containing a
power to convey real property as the agent or attorney for
the owner of such property ...
Chapter 51, section 291. A conveyance of real property,
within the state, on being duly acknowledged by the person
executing the same, or proved as required by this chapter,
and such acknowledgment or proof duly certified when re-
quired by this chapter, may be recorded in the office of the
clerk of the county where such real property is situated, and
such county clerk shall, upon the request of any party, on
tender of the lawful fees therefor, record the same in his
said office. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void
as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for
a valuable consideration, from the same vendor, his heirs
or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof,
whose conveyance is first duly recorded.
North Carolina Code (1931)
Section 3311. No deed of trust or mortgage of real or
personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as
against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration
from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor, but from the regis-
tration of such deed or mortgage in the county where the
land lies. ...
Page's Annotated Ohio General Code (1926)
Section 8542. All mortgages, executed agreeably to the
provisions of this chapter, shall be recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the mortgaged premises
are situated, and take effect from the time they are delivered
to the recorder of the proper county for record. If two or
more mortgages are presented for record on the same day,
they shall take effect from the order of presentation for
record. The first presented must be the first recorded, and
the first recorded shall have preference.
PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
Section 8543. All other deeds and instruments of writing
for the conveyance or incumbrance of lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, executed agreeably to the provisions of this
chapter, shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which the premises are situated, and until so
recorded or filed for record, they shall be deemed fraudu-
lent, so far as relates to a subsequent bona fide purchaser
having, at the time of the purchase, no knowledge of the
existence of such former deed or instrument.
Pennsylvania Statutes (1920)
Section 8822. All deeds and conveyances, which, from
and after the passage of this act, shall be made and executed
within this commonwealth of or concerning any lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments in this commonwealth, or whereby
the title to the same may be in any way affected in law or
equity, shall be acknowledged by the grantor, or grantors,
bargainor or bargainors, or proved by one or more of the
subscribing witnesses thereto, before one of the judges of
the supreme court, or before one of the judges of the court
of common pleas, or recorder of deeds, prothonotary, or
clerk of any court of record, justice of the peace, or notary
public of the county wherein said conveyed lands lie, and
shall be recorded in the office for the recording of deeds
where such lands, tenements or hereditaments are lying and
being, within ninety days aftdr the execution of such deeds
or conveyance, and every such deed and conveyance that
shall at any time after the passage of this act be made and
executed in this commonwealth, and which shall not be
proved and recorded as aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudu-
lent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mort-
gagee for a valid consideration, or any creditor of the grantor
or bargainor in said deed of conveyance ....
Lord's Oregon Laws (1910)
Section 7129. Every conveyance of real property within
this state hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as
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provided in this title within five days thereafter, shall be
void against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and
for a valuable consideration of the same real property, or
any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly
recorded.
B
The foregoing excerpts from various recording statutes
serve to illustrate the varying phraseology in use in different
states and to indicate in a general way the nature of the re-
cording system. They will serve as a basis for the discus-
sion of the problems considered in this article. Not all of
the problems connected with recording are dealt with here-
in, so, in dealing with a concrete case, the statute involved
should be considered in its entirety together with any judi-
cial interpretation thereof.
The English Statute of 7 Anne (1709) c. 20, which was
applicable only to the county of Middlesex, is one of the
earliest of the registry statutes. This statute provides that
every deed or conveyance, made and executed after a cer-
tain date, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any
subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee, for a valuable con-
sideration, unless a memorial thereof be registered before
the registering of the deed or conveyance, under which such
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim. Nothing is
said about "notice" or "bona fide purchaser." When the
Court of King's Bench was called upon for the first time to
construe this statute it was held that the preference given
to the subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee, who registered
his deed or conveyance first would not be affected at law by
the fact that he had actual notice of the prior unrecorded
deed.2  That court stated its inability to give relief against
fraud;3 yet it recognized the impropriety of adhering to the
2 Doe d. Robinson v. Allsop, 5 B. & Aid. 142 (1821).
3 "It must be, however, since the provision of the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture Act, giving the rules of equity binding efficacy wherever they conflict with
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letter of the statute in cases where doing so would result
in protecting fraud rather than preventing it. The court of
chancery had, many years before, recognized and adopted
the rule that if a subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee, even
for a valuable consideration, had received notice of a prior
unregistered conveyance, or mortgage, his conveyance, or
mortgage, though registered, is subordinate to the prior un-
registered one of which he had received notice at or before
the time he became a transferee.4 Although the court of
chancery "was willing to apply its doctrine of notice ' in
favor of unregistered deeds, it was not willing to consider
the registration of a deed as equivalent to actual notice and
gave 'no greater efficacy to deeds that are registered than
they had before.' The doctrine of constructive notice from
registration had therefore no place in England under this
statute. In the nature of things, registration would hardly
have allowed the scope for constructive notice which has
those of the law concerning the same matter, that the same doctrine [that of
notice] is now enforced in legal as well as in equitable suits by the English courts."
Pomerory's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., § 659, note 2.
In this country the equitable doctrine of notice is recognized and enforced
alike by the courts of equity and of law, "for the reason that both have jurisdic-
tion in matters of fraud." Pomerory, § 659.
"The only point that remains to be considered in this case is whether the
question of notice is not exclusively of equity cognizance.
"The decisions have come from the Court of Chancery, but whenever the
point has occurred to the judges of the courts of the common law, they have
recognized the existence and solidity of the rule. (Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burr.
474, and Lord Kenyon, in Peake's N. P. 190, 191.) And if the question of con-
struction of the statute, and not merely of a trust or equity binding on the
conscience, the cognizance of it must belong equally to a court of law. The design
of the Act was to give notice, by means of the registry, and thereby prevent
imposition, mistake and fraud. . . .Courts of law and equity are equally bound
to give statutes a sound interpretation, in the prevention of mischief, and are
equally bound to carry the intention into effect; and the courts of law have con-
current jurisdiction in all cases of fraud." Kent, Ch., in Jackson, ex. dem., v.
Burgott, 10 Johns. 457, 462, 463 (1813).
4 Blades v. Blades, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 358 (1727). See Le Neve v. Le Neve,
Amb. 436 (1747).
5 Actual or constructive.
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come to prevail in this country from the fact that here the
deed has to be recorded and that the record is the main
evidence of title." 6
The system of recording has been developed to its greatest
extent in this country. Its history antedates even the stat-
ute of 7 Anne. The usage of recording deeds prevailed from
the early settlement of New England and some of the south-
ern colonies. I The scope of operation of the recording
statutes has been extended, rather than limited, where
changes have been made, so that some of them include near-
ly every kind of interest that may be created in real prop-
erty.
While the recording operates to preserve the muniments of
title and to perpetuate the evidence of their voluntary exe-
cution,8 probably the greatest importance of recording is its
effect on priorities as between successive transferees of the
same real property from the same transferor.9 The rules
of the common law and equity regarding priority are
changed to some extent by the recording acts. At the com-
mon law, the title of a purchaser ordinarily depended, first
upon the title of his vendor, and, secondly, upon whether the
vendor transferred his title to the purchaser. If the vendor
had no title, or if his title was defective, it was not material
that the purchaser paid the full value of the property and
thought he was acquiring a perfect title.' ° Under this rule,
the first purchaser to acquire the legal title prevailed. A
subsequent purchaser from the same vendor, though paying
the full value of the property, and thinking he was acquir-
ing a good title, acquired no title under the second con-
6 Percy Bordwell, Recording of Instruments Affecting Land, 2 Iowa Law
Bul. 51, 52.
7 Webb on Record of Title, § 3.
8 Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 4.
9 "Recording becomes material only when there are double conveyances,
etc., by the same person." Per Blease, J., in Epps v. McCallum Realty Co., 138
S. E. 297, 302 (S. C. 1927).
10 Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd ed., § 566.
PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
veyance, for the reason that the vendor, having parted with
his title, had nothing which he could convey. The record-
ing acts have changed this rule. If the first purchaser fails
to record the instrument under which his rights are claimed,
and the instrument is recordable, a subsequent purchaser for
value and without notice thereof will not be affected thereby.
The doctrine that a bona fide purchaser of a legal interest
will not be deprived thereof in a court of equity at the in-
stance of the holder of a prior equitable interest, created
by the same transferor, has been changed by recording
statutes allowing or requiring the recording of the instru-
ment under which the prior equitable interest is claimed. If
such instrument is recorded before a transfer of the legal
interest, the equitable interest will not be affected by the
later transfer.
The courts have adopted various views as to the way in
which the recording statutes operate' 1' One is that such
statutes are legislative extensions of the doctrine of estoppel;
that they "rest upon and enforce the equitable proposition
that he who knowingly conceals his ownership when he
ought to disclose it shall not assert it to the detriment of
his neighbor who has acted in reliance upon his silence." 12
Professor Aigler says that "If the postponement of the earlier
to the later deed was held only, in those cases where the later
grantee has actually been misled by the apparent state of
the title as disclosed by the record, it might be said that
'Registry statutes are legislative extensions of the doctrine
of estoppel.' But it is clear that the earlier deed must give
way when there is present the situation stated in the statute
whether the subsequent grantee was in truth misled or not.
Whether he has ever been near the records or not is wholly
immaterial in respect of his ability to rely on the non-record
of an earlier deed." '"
11 See Aigler, op. ci. supra note 1.
12 Boynton v. Haggart, 120 Fed. 819, 823 (1903).
12 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 408.
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Another view is that the recording acts operate according
to the "doctrine that where 'one of two innocent persons
must suffer by the fraud of a third party,' 14 the one who
was most at fault, or whose fault made it possible that there
be any loss must suffer." 11 Probably in only a very small
percentage of the cases can it be maintained that the grantor
in the prior unrecorded instrument has in any proper sense
been guilty of fraud. "At least, the recording acts do not
avail a subsequent purchaser only when the grantor was
guilty of fraud." 11
Two more views as to the way in which the recording acts
operate are set forth in Epps v. McCallum Realty Co." One
is that these statutes "invest the grantor or incumbrancer
with power to defeat a previous conveyance or incumbrance,
if not recorded as provided, by a subsequent conveyance or
incumbrance to one who has no actual notice of such pre-
vious conveyance or incumbrance. The holder of such pre-
vious conveyance or incumbrance, by complying with the
recording acts, may wholly disarm the grantor or incum-
brancer of such power, and thereby protect himself." Ac-
cording to this view, recording operates to preserve a posi-
tion of advantage. Thus, if R, owner of Blackacre, mort-
gages Blackacre to E-1, and executes a later mortgage of
the same property to E-2, E-1, by failing to record his mort-
gage, may put R in a position to divest the interest passing
to him under the first mortgage, in favor of E-2 who has no
notice of the first mortgage. So E-1 would lose any posi-
tion of advantage that he would have had at common law or
in equity, given to him by the force of operation of his
conveyance, because of this power invested in R under the
statutes and not necessarily because E-2 took without notice.
At the common law, if the mortgage to E-1, is legal and that
14 Smith's Heirs v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 21 Ala. 125, 135 (1852).
15 Op. cit. supra note 13.
16 Aigler, ap. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 408, 409.
17 Op. cit. supra note 9.
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to E-2 is equitable, priority would go to E-1 by virtue of the
force attached to the transfer to him. Equity has favored
the prior legal interest as against a later equitable interest; "
and equity has generally refused to permit the defense of
bona fide purchaser against a prior legal title. Under the
early chancery practice this defense was available as against
a prior legal title where the plaintiff was invoking the
auxiliary, as distinct from the exclusive or concurrent, juris-
diction of a court of equity.19 These principles would be
applicable at the common law and in equity where R pur-
ports to create a legal mortgage in favor of E-1 and subse-
quently purports to create a legal mortgage in favor of E-2.
But, where the recording statute is applicable, E-1 invests R
with a power, by not recording his mortgage, to displace his
position of advantage, which he would have had at the com-
mon law, or in equity, by virtue of the prior transfer of the
legal interest, in favor of E-2. This view is important
where the recording statute allows a grantee a certain period
of time within which to record his transfer. Suppose R,
owner and possessor of Blackacre, executes a conveyance of
a legal interest in Blackacre to G who subsequently records
his transfer within the stated statutory period; between the
date of execution and the date of recordation of this deed,
R purports to convey to X, a bona fide purchaser for value.
While G is entitled to priority over X, it would not be on the
ground of notice, unless it be a fictitious notice. G has
merely preserved his position of advantage, obtained by
the force of operation of his transfer, by complying with the
recording statute. But this method of approach would not
be applicable if the transfer to G is of an equitable interest
that is recordable and the transfer to X is of a legal inter-
est. In Camp Mfg. Co. v. Carpenter 20 recordation within
the stated period, though after a subsequent transfer had
18 Op. cit. supra note 10.
19 Op. cit. supra note 10, at footnote 7.
20 70 S. E. 497 (Va. 1911).
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been made, was said to operate as constructive notice. This
view would be a solution of transaction where the first
transfer was of an equity and the second was of a legal in-
terest.
The second view, and the one that is asserted generally by
the courts in this country, set forth in the Epps case as to
the way in which the recording of an instrument, authorized
or required to be recorded, operates is that the record con-
stitutes constructive notice to the subsequent transferees and
other persons contemplated by the particular statute. Pro-
fessor Aigler has discussed four situations, and suggested
others, in which he says that this effect of recording is vital
in determining priorities.2'
1. "Where the prior conveyance is of an equity and the
later one is a transfer of the legal estate to one who is other-
wise a bona fide purchaser for value it is of the utmost im-
portance that it be determined whether the record of the
earlier conveyance gave notice to the grantee of the legal
estate. In such case application of the rules of priority as
developed by the common law and equity would result in
giving preference to the later grantee. It is held, however,
that the earlier instrument being on record, the subsequent
grantee took with constructive notice thereof, and, there-
fore, is to be postponed to the equity." 22 This assumes that
the prior equitable interest is recordable for the recordation
of an instrument not contemplated by the particular statute
will not operate as constructive notice to the subsequent
transferees contemplated by the statute.
2. "Whether after acquired interests shall be held to
have inured to the benefit of the grantee in a deed upon
which an estoppel can be rested as against a subsequent pur-
chaser from the grantor in such estoppel deed, may very
21 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1.
22 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 412, citing Edwards v. Kernan, 55
Mich. 520 (1885); Simonson v. Wensel, 27 N. D. 638 (1914); Parkest v. Alex-
ander, 1 John. Ch. 394 (1815); Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis. 326 (1862).
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properly involve a determination of whether recording gives
notice or not. Take the typical case: A, without any in-
terest or with only a limited interest, makes a deed pur-
porting to convey absolutely to B and warrants the title
thereto; B records; later on A gets in the outstanding in-
terest and deeds the same premises covered by the deed
to B to X who pays value and has no knowledge of the deed
to B. As to what really happens when A gets in the out-
standing interest there is an important difference of opin-
ion." 2 One view is that when A gets in the outstanding
interest there is an inurement thereof to the benefit of B,24
the estoppel being fed,25 as it is sometimes said. The
estoppel deed is said to have a double operation, first as
an estoppel, and second to pass the interest the moment
A acquires it. Notice would have no scope of operation in
this view; but prompt recordation by B would operate to
preserve a position of advantage given to him by the force
of operation of his conveyance. Another view is that an
equitable interest arises in B subjecting A to an estoppel to
set up his legal ownership.26 B is entitled to call for a con-
veyance from A, as soon as A acquires the interest, in equity;
but the interest does not vest in B by virtue of an estoppel.
The question of recordation operating as constructive notice
arises in this view. If B obtains only an equity, it would
have to be recordable to enable B to take advantage of the
recording operating as constructive notice. If B's interest
is not recordable, but is recorded, he ordinarily gains no ad-
vantage from the fact of recordation; he would have to rely
upon some, or one, of the other species of constructive notice,
or upon actual notice, to prevail as against the subsequent
transferee for value. If B fails to record, then X would
prevail under the second view, according to the rules of the
23 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 413.
24 Jarvis v. Aikens, 25 Vt. 635 (1853); Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97 (1874).
25 Jarvis v. Aikens, op. 6ft. supra note 24.
26 Jordan v. Chambers, 226 Pa. 573, 75 AtI. 956 (1910).
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common law and equity; but, under the first view as to the
way in which the estoppel operates, B would prevail over X
by virtue of the force of the conveyance to B, both at the
common law and in equity. The recording statutes, how-
ever, would operate to give a power to A to defeat the un-
recorded deed in favor of X.
3. Under the statute of 27 Eliz., c. 4, conveyances in
fraud of subsequent purchasers are declared void. "Though
the contrary was held in England,"7 it is the prevailing
view 28 in this country that in order for the subsequent pur-
chaser to avoid the alleged fraudulent conveyance he must
have been a purchaser for value without notice. It is further
held that if the transfer claimed to have been fraudulent
was recorded the subsequent purchaser is thereby charged
with notice." 29 The principal difference between the Eng-
lish doctrine and that prevailing in the United States is
this: By the former, the mere execution of a "voluntary
deed" raises the presumption-which cannot be rebutted-
of fraud as against subsequent purchasers for value, while by
the latter view a subsequent conveyance by a grantor who
had made a conveyance to another transferee without con-
sideration is presumptive evidence of fraud,-a presumption
that may be rebutted by the transferee in the "voluntary
conveyance." Where the subsequent purchaser has notice,
actual "0 or constructive, the presumption ceases to operate."'
4. "In contests between claimants of artisans' or ma-
terialmens' liens, on the one side, and prior chattel mort-
gages or conditional sale vendors whose mortgages or con-
27 Doe ex dem. Otley v. Manning, 9 East 59 (1807).
28 Beal v. Warren, 2 Gray 447, 450 (1854); Cooke v. Kell, 13 Md. 469
(1859).
29 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 413, 414.
30 Baltimore v. Williams, 6 Md. 235, 267 (1854); Cooke v. Kell, op. cit.
supra note 28.
31 The decisions do not seem to have been influenced by the fact that the
recording statute involved provided that no title passes as against creditors and
subsequent purchasers unless the conveyance is recorded and not that the con-
veyance shall be fraudulent and void as against such persons.
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tracts have been filed or recorded as prescribed, on the other,
the case is made to turn, unnecessarily so it would seem,
on the ground that the lien claimant had notice." 32 The
problem involved in this class of cases will be discussed more
at length in a subsequent part of this paper. It is merely
intended to point out here that priority has been made to
depend upon notice from recordation.
In some states the recording statutes provide that an un-
recorded transfer shall be void as against a subsequent pur-
chaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration whose
conveyance shall first be duly recorded. Various situations
have arisen under this type of statute illustrating the attitude
of the courts towards the way in which such a statute
operates.
1. Suppose there are two successive purported transfers
of the same land, from the same transferor to different
transferees, neither of which have been recorded, and the
later transferee is a bona fide purchaser for value. Who is
entitled to priority? In Crouse v. Mitchell 3 there were two
unrecorded assignments of a leasehold interest to successive
transferees, the later one being a bona fide assignee for value.
The court held that "the general rule that, as between two
unrecorded conveyances, the one first made has priority,
applies." If the second assignee had recorded his assign-
ment first, a literal interpretation of the statute would have
given him the preference. Since neither transferee recorded
his transfer, the rule at common law and in equity would
give priority to the first transfer of a legal interest, if both
purported transfers were of such an interest; and the rule
in equity would give priority to the first transfer of an equit-
able interest, if both purported transfers were of such an in-
terest. In the Crouse case both transfers were of interests
32 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 414.
33 130 Mich. 347, 90 N. W. 32 (1902). Cf. Temple v. Osburn, 55 Ore. 506,
106 Pac. 16 (1910).
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of the same nature. If the prior transfer is of an equity
and the latter is of a legal interest, both of which are record-
able and not recorded, the bona fide later transferee for
value should prevail. A recording of the earlier transfer
of an equity, if the transfer is recordable, before the record-
ing of the second transfer would, however, give priority to
the holder of this interest.
2. Suppose the first transferee records his recordable
transfer before the later bona fide purchaser for value re-
cords his conveyance; does the recording statute exclude all
other adverse effect than that which it denounces against a
transferee who fails to place his transfer on record? That
is to say, does priority depend upon an abstract construction
of the terms of the statute, or are the equities of the parties
to be considered? In Wisconsin 4 priority has been made
to turn upon a consideration of the equities of the parties.
Thus, while the first transfer may be recorded first, it will
not necessarily be preferred over a second transfer which
is subsequently recorded. The earlier transferee might
be estopped to claim priority as against the later transferee.
In Marling v. Milwaukee Realty Co.85 a mortgage on cer-
tain land had been assigned to A by the mortgagee prior to
a sale of the land by the mortgagor to G, but the assign-
ment was not recorded until after the sale was consummated,
the record being made approximately five years and four
months after the assignment was made. At the time of the
sale of the property a release of the mortgage was obtained
from the mortgagee by payment to him of the amount of
the mortgage by the vendor-mortgagor, the mortgagee prom-
ising to obtain and deliver the note and mortgage within a
few days, which he failed to do, but instead absconded. It
34 Marling v. Milwaukee Realty Co., 127 Wis. 363, 106 N. W. 844, 5 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 412, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1017 (1906).
The principle involved in this case differs from that involved in the cases
where one deals with the debt evidenced by a negotiable note, and another
person has possession of the note.
85 Op. cit. supra note 34.
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was held that A was estopped to enforce the mortgage as
against G. The mortgagor was a dealer in real estate, so
that the likelihood of its sale was apparent to A. And A
was bound to. know that parties dealing with the title to
the land would do so on the faith of the record. So the fact
that A recorded the assignment before the recording of the
release and the consummation of the sale was immaterial.
Clearly A did not record her assignment within a reasonable
time. As to this phase of the case, the court said:
"Since the adoption of the system of public registry of conveyances,
the custom of prompt registration has been so nearly universal that
omissions may well be considered neglect of those precautions custom-
arily -taken to assert a grantee's rights in the land, and, people gen-
erally, have become accustomed to 'believe that all rights will so appear
and to act confidently on that assumption; hence such conduct is to be
expected by one holding an unrecorded conveyance."
According to this view, priority of recording is not decisive
of priority of right. A careless prior transferee might be
estopped to assert priority of recording as against a later
transferee for value and without notice.
3. Suppose a later transfer is first recorded. As to
priority of right, the earlier transferee will prevail, unless
the subsequent transferee not only shows the priority of
recording but that he purchased in good faith and for a
valuable consideration. 6 In order to obtain the statutory
preference, the subsequent purchaser must be a purchaser
for a valuable consideration and without notice of the
earlier transfer. Webb has stated the following rules that
are applicable in this class of cases:
"Where each of two mortgages, given to different parties, is to secure
indebtedness incurred in each case before the execution of either of
them, neither one, while unrecorded, can claim a higher equity than
the other; and in such case, even actual notice given to the second
mortgagee before his mortgage is taken, cannot deprive him of the
preference acquired under the statute by a first record." 37
36 Hiddleson v. Cahoon, 214 Pac. 1042, 1043 (Idaho 1923); Bell v. Pleasant,
145 Cal. 413, 78 Pac. 957, 104 Am. St. Rep. 61 (1904).
37 Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 14.
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The courts, in dealing with this situation, have reasoned that
the taking of a mortgage by the second mortgagee to secure
the payment of his debt does not prevent him from being a
purchaser "in good faith"; and that there would not be an
intent to defraud the first mortgagee, who had likewise taken
his mortgage to secure an existing indebtedness. 8  This
view operates as an undeserved hardship upon the first
mortgagee who has neglected to record his mortgage in
favor of a second mortgagee who has suffered no harm
therefrom, and results in a race for priority by recording
where two creditors are trying to collect their debts. Grant-
ing that diligence in such a race should be encouraged, has
not the first mortgagee likewise been diligent in the matter
of obtaining a first mortgage? While the latter has not
recorded, there is no deceptive situation as to the second
mortgagee. It would seem that recording should only be
necessary, to complete the transfer in such a case, where
the second mortgagee acquired his mortgage without notice
of the first mortgage.
Some statutes provide that until recorded a conveyance
shall not be effectual to pass title as against creditors and
subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration. Under
this type of statute, recording of a transfer is necessary for
the completion thereof. So priority of right, as between
successive transferees, depends upon priority of recording.8
A second mortgagee is not entitled to a preference over a
first mortgagee, unless the former records his transfer first."
Neither is the latter entitled to priority of right unless he
records first. If both transfers are recorded simultaneously,
the one executed first gives priority of right. 1 Notice or
lack of notice has no scope of operation in such a doctrine.
38 Moore v. Thomas, 1 Ore. 201, 204 (1855).
39 McHan v. Dorsey, 173 N. C. 649, 92 S. E. 598 (1917).
40 McHan v. Dorsey, op. cit. supra note 39.
41 McHan v. Dorsey, op. cit. supra note 39.
In Beers v. Hawley, 2 Conn. 467, 469 (1818), this type of statute was dis-
cussed as follows: "It is generally true, that the deed which is first recorded shall
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Where the recording statute does not in express terms
make priority of right depend upon priority of recording,
there is a conflict of authority as to whether priority of
recording, or the want of it, is material. In some jurisdic-
tions priority of recording gives priority of right.42 Thus,
under a statute providing that deeds, conveyances, and
agreements in writing affecting any interest in real estate
shall take effect as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and
incumbrancers by mortgage after filing for record, it has
been held that the word "subsequent" has reference to the
recording and not to the date of the execution of the in-
strument.4 3  A transfer executed between the date of exe-
cution and the date of recording of another transfer would
not give priority of right; recording by the first transferee
before the second transferee records operates to give the
former priority of right. The view that is sustained by
the weight of authority 44 protects the subsequent bona
fide purchaser regardless of priority of record; and, in most
jurisdictions, a subsequent bona fide purchaser for a valu-
able consideration is entitled to priority of right as against
a prior transferee, regardless of whether the later transfer
was first recorded. This view should allow the first trans-
prevail; but to this there are exceptions. Where the second grantee, having notice
of the existence of a prior deed, procures his deed to be first recorded, it shall
not prevail against such prior deed. Where the first grantee procures his deed
to be recorded within a reasonable and proper time after its execution, it will
be valid against a subsequent deed, though first recorded; for every such pur-
chaser is entitled to a reasonable time to procure his deed to be recorded. Both
these deeds bear date, and were recorded, on the same day; but the deed to
Minor was received for record, about five minutes before the deed to Wright.
As both deeds were recorded within a reasonable time, it becomes material to
ascertain the time of their execution; for if their execution was simultaneous,
Minor and Wright, by operation of law, became tenants in common."
42 Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Min. Co., 34 Colo. 365, 82 Pac. 484 (1905);
Simmons v. Stum, 101 Ill. 454 (1882).
43 Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Min. Co., op. cit. supra note 42.
44 Steiner v. Clisby, 95 Ala. 91, 10 So. 240 (1891), rehearing denied in 95
Ala. 95, 11 So. 294 (1891); De Courcy v. Collins, 21 N. J. Eq. 357 (1869)
(Chattel mortgage recording act); Craig v. Osborn, 98 So. 598 (Miss. 1923),
discussed in a note in 37 Har. L. Rev. 1141; Swanstrom v. Washington Trust
Co., 41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 1112 (1906).
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feree a reasonable time, apart from a statutory provision on
the matter, in which to record his transfer. Where the
recording statute allows a specific time in which to record
and the first transfer is not recorded within that time, a
second competing transfer, whether executed within this
time or after the expiration thereof, is entitled to priority.45
In the absence of any provision as to priority of recording,
the policy of the statutes would seem to be duly observed
by protecting one purchasing for value and without notice
subsequent to the execution of the unrecorded instrument 46
and after the expiration of a reasonable time from the date
of execution of that instrument. Such statutes are designed
to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers against decep-
tive situations rather than to compel placing instruments on
record. "The minority opinion, however, is not without
merit, for it does tend to enforce a general and speedy
recording of instruments." 4 7 It is in keeping with the gen-
eral practice of resorting to the recording books or records
before purchasing land; and, in this connection, the policy
of the recording acts is to make the recording books as
complete a depository as possible of land titles.
45 Scheffer v. Fithian, 17 Ind. 463 (1861).
46 See Note, 37 Har. L. Rev. 1141, 1142; Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at
§§ 13, 14, 166.
47 Note, 37 Har. L. Rev. 1141, 1142.
Professor Hanna argues: "Would not the penalty of subordinating an unre-
corded conveyance to the rights of subsequent bona fide purchasers seem to be
a sufficient club to induce prompt recording of conveyances? If fear of such
eventuality will not spur to quick action a grantee or mortgagee, is the additional
penalty of subjecting him to the claim of an unknown prior grantee who may
first record, (a far less probable contingency?) likely to be more potent? If not,
what validity has the argument in support of the New York rule (the New
York recording statute provides that an unrecorded conveyance shall be void as
to any subsequent purchaser "whose conveyance is first duly recorded"] that
it tends to enforce a general and speedy recording of instruments? . . . Does it
not rather impose an additional undeserved hardship upon a negligent party for
the benefit of one, who, unlike the subsequent bona fide purchaser, has suffered
no injury by reason of the neglect to record? Clearly the beneficiary is as
morally reprehensible a person as the party punished. And the former's fault
is the sine qua non of the latter's difficulty." Hanna, Cases and Materials on
Security, 717.
PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
Where the recording statute expressly makes priority of
right depend upon priority of recording, a bona fide quit-
claim grantee whose deed was executed and recorded be-
tween the date of execution and the date of recording of a
prior deed of bargain and sale has been held not to have
priority of right in New Jersey.4" This is on the theory
that a quitclaim deed does not pass any more rights than
the grantor has, and does not give the one who claims under
it the rights of a bona fide purchaser under the statute. 9
Where priority of right is not expressly made to depend
upon priority of recording and the statute merely provides
that a conveyance not duly recorded shall be void as to
subsequent bona fide purchasers, it has been decided that
a purchaser at a sale ordered in condemnation proceedings
who delayed for about eight years getting a sheriff's deed
to the land was not entitled to priority as against a bona
fide transferee of the property whose conveyance was exe-
cuted and recorded about a year before the sheriff's deed
was obtained by the first purchaser.5 ° The order of con-
demnation was not a judgment, nor did it fix a lien upon
the land.5 The record of the condemnation proceedings
would not constitute notice.52 So the purchaser at a sale,
ordered in such proceeding, would have to rely upon the con-
structive notice of lis pendens; and this notice would only
be operative for a reasonable time after the sale until the
deed of the sheriff is obtained. If that deed is obtained
within a reasonable time after the sale, it will overreach any
intervening transfers. This rule accords with the view that
lis pendens is founded upon the necessity of both equity and
48 Meeks v. Bickford, 125 Atl. 15 (N. J. 1924), reversing a decree of the
Court of Chancery, 122 Atl. 683 (1923).
49 See a discussion of the status of a quitclaim grantee, in a former part of
this paper, 8 Notre Dame Law. 69-77.
50 Hammock v. Qualls, 139 Tenn. 388, 201 S. W. 517 (1918).
51 Hammock v. Qualis, op. cit. supra note 50.
52 Hammock v. Qualls, op. cit. supra note 50.
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common law courts of keeping the subject of the litigation
before the court and preventing frustration of the court's
judgment or decree.
In another class of cases the solution of the problem of
priority of right has been approached from the point of view
of constructive notice. Suppose that the owner of certain
land mortgages it to A, and then mortgages it to B, who
has notice of the earlier mortgage and who records before
the mortgage to A is recorded; that, after both mortgages
are recorded, B assigns his mortgage to C, who has no knowl-
edge of the mortgage to A. In Flynt v. Arnold" Chief
Justice Shaw, in dealing with this situation, said that since
B's mortgage was recorded when the mortgage to C was
executed, it was constructive notice to C. This view, which
is expressed in a dictum, is not supported by the earlier "
and later cases " in Massachusetts, which adopt the rule
that a purchaser examining the record of title is not expected
to look beyond a "good conveyance" to his grantor; or that
a purchaser, in tracing the record title down, need not ex-
amine the records after the date of recording of the con-
veyance to his grantor; that if he is required to look one
day, or one page, beyond that which exhibits the title of
his grantor, it will be impossible to say where the inquiry
shall stop. In Vermont it has been held that a purchaser
is bound by the constructive notice afforded by the record-
ing of the first deed; that it is notice to him of the fact that
a deed prior to that of his grantor has been made, but it is
not notice that his grantor had notice of the first deed."
The conveyance to the purchaser from the second grantee
is preferred, not because the purchaser is himself a pur-
53 2 Met. 619, 623 (1841).
If B assigns his mortgage to C before A records, and C has no knowledge of
A's mortgage and is an assignee for value, C would be entitled to a preference
over A.
54 State of Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296 (1817); Trull v. Bigelow,
16 Mass. 405 (1820); Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 157.
55 Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. 112 (1885).
56 Day v. Clark, 25 Vt. 397 (1853).
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chaser without notice, for the registration of the prior deed
is notice of its existence, nor because his grantor was a pur-
chaser without notice, for that may or may not be true,
but because the purchaser did not know that his grantor
was not a bona fide purchaser. And thus one may secure
protection, as though one were a bona fide purchaser, when
neither he, nor any one through whom he derives his title,
was in fact such a purchaser. In Woods v. Garnett "' the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, in construing a recording
statute similar to that existing in Massachusetts, discusses
the Massachusetts rule and concludes that the better reason
and weight of authority are opposed to the Massachusetts
view. The Mississippi court argued:
"But for the registry law, where one has conveyed his title, he has
nothing left to convey to another, and that other, with or without
notice of the prior conveyance, would get nothing, for his grantor
had nothing to convey. Now, the statute comes, and provides that,
though a conveyance of the class named in the statute may be made,
it shall, as to certain persons, viz., creditors and purchasers without
notice, be valid only from a certain time, viz., the time when it is
filed for record. In other words, the operation of the unrecorded con-
veyance is suspended until it shall be recorded as against creditors and
purchasers without notice, and where recorded, it does not operate
by relation as against such persons from the day of its execution, but
is effectual only from and of the date of its delivery for record. But
where filed for record it has full' scope and effect against the world.
One who buys after that event can find no protection in the statute,
for its terms have been complied with by the holder of the adverse
title. It is no answer to say that it is inconvenient to the purchaser
to examine a long and voluminous record, made after the record of
the title of his grantor. To this the sufficient reply is that, but for
the registry acts, he would not have even the protection which the
records afford, but would deal at his peril with his grantor, and secure
only such title as he might assert. If that grantor had good title be-
cause a purchaser for value, without notice, that is a defense to his
vendee; but if such grantor was not such purchaser, then the validity
of the title he conveys must depend upon the character of his vendee;
and, if such vendee is not a bona fide purchaser under the common
57 Woods v. Garnett, 16 So. 390, 392 (Miss. 1894). Accord: Van Rensselser
v. Clark, 17 Wend. 23 (1837).
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law or the statute, we cannot perceive from what source a principle
can be deduced which will afford him protection. It seems to us that
one who buys an estate cannot invoke the protection of the registry
act as against a deed recorded under such act at the time of his pur-
chase."
Webb adopts the same view. He says:5"
"It is more in consolance ...with the policy and broader spirit of
the registry law that a subsequent purchaser should be chargeable by
the record with notice of every conveyance emanating from any party
through or under whom the purchaser claims and registered at the
time his rights accrue."
The decisions in California,59 South Dakota6 ° and Wis-
consin 61 reach practically the same result as that obtaining
in Mississippi, but they proceed on a different principle.
The recording statutes, involved in the cases decided in these
states, provided that an unrecorded recordable transfer
should be void as against a subsequent purchaser in good
faith of the same property, whose conveyance should be first
recorded. In the first place, it is decided that the operation
of these recording statutes is not confined to successive pur-
chasers of the same land from the same grantor, but that
they apply to a contest between a remote purchaser through
mesne conveyances from a grantor and an immediate grantee
of such grantor. Secondly, it is decided that when a con-
veyance is made to a grantee who fails to record his" deed
until after another has received and recorded a conveyance
from the same grantor, but with notice or knowledge of the
58 Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 157.
Compare the following situation: ". . where A conveys to B, who neglects
to record his deed but conveys to C, the record of the deed from B to C will
not charge with notice a subsequent purchaser from A. Where there is such a
break in the chain of recorded title, the records, it is said, will not enable the
purchaser to supply the missing links, and to connect the broken parts by any
systematic search. It has even been declared that this rule is essential to any
just working of the registry system. This, however, is manifestly giving an undue
importance to this matter of convenience and the sequence of names in the index
for searchers." Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 158.
59 Mahoney v. Middleton, 41 Cal. 41 (1871).
60 Parrish v. Mahany, 73 N. W. 97 (S. D. 1897).
61 Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 (1872). This decision overruled the earlier
view to the contrary in Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 529 (1866).
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first deed, the first grantee is entitled to priority as against
a purchaser from the second grantee, even though the latter
purchaser has no knowledge of the first deed. The theory
on which the courts in these states proceed is that when the
first transferee records he becomes a bona fide purchaser
whose deed is first recorded;62 and that the record of the
first deed constitutes constructive notice to the purchaser
from the second grantee,6 s even though the deed to the
second grantee is first recorded. Also, assuming that such
record does not constitute constructive notice, the purchaser
from the second grantee would have to record first in order
to be entitled to priority over the first grantee.64 While the
difference between this type of statute and that involved in
the Massachusetts and Mississippi decisions must lead to a
difference of construction, the question as to what extent a
subsequent purchaser might reasonably be required to go
in searching the record arises under both classes of statutes.
Where the statute expressly makes priority of right depend
upon priority of recording, it seems to presuppose careless-
ness on the part of a first purchaser in placing his convey-
ance on record. The operation of such a statute, so far as
it.goes in favor of a first purchaser, is not limited to the
first, second, or any specified number of first recorded trans-
fers to subsequent purchasers, or from one such purchaser
to another, and consequently the right of the first purchaser
to priority by the recording of his deed continues, or may
continue after any number of subsequent conveyances have
been recorded. The subsequent purchasers, one and all,
may not have bought in good faith or for a valuable con-
sideration; so the first purchaser will be entitled to priority
62 Falla.s v. Pierce, op. cit. supra note 61.
63 Fallass v. Pierce, op. cit. sura note 61; Mahoney v. Middleton, op. cit.
supra note 59.
64 Falass v. Pierce, op. cit. supra note 61.
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over all of them. Suppose A successively conveys to B and
C, the latter having notice of B's transfer. C records, and
afterwards conveys to D, who has notice of B's deed, and
D conveys to E, who has notice of B's deed. Then suppose
B records his deed and subsequently E conveys to X, who
has no knowledge of B's transfer. B would be entitled to
priority as against X. This difficulty would arise, also, un-
der a statute not expressly making priority of right depend
upon priority of recording. Under the latter type of stat-
ute, B would usually be allowed a reasonable time in which
to record as against subsequent purchasers from the same
grantor, and he should be allowed a reasonable time in which
to record as against one subsequent purchaser from another
where the last one, as X in the illustration used above.
claims to be a bona fide purchaser. Where the statute al-
lows the first purchaser a specified time in which to record,
to be entitled to priority as against subsequent purchasers
in good faith, a solution of the problem as to the extent of
search would be much easier and could be more definite.
In a case where two successive purchasers from the same
grantor are competing for priority of right, the first one
may, because of delay in recording his transfer, lose a
position of advantage, assured to him at the common law
and in equity, as against the second transferee under either
the Massachusetts or Wisconsin type of recording statute.
The extent of search required would seem to depend upon
the extent of time allowed, in the particular jurisdiction, to
the first purchaser, from a common grantor in the chain of
title, to record his transfer. The inconvenience involved
under this view would not be great today under modem
systems of abstracting. The inconvenience could be les-
sened by a recording statute allowing a first purchaser a
short period of time, five days for instance, in which to
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record his conveyance and be protected as against a sub-
sequent bona fide purchaser from the same grantor, or as
against a bona fide purchaser from a second transferee who
has notice of the first conveyance.
In another class of cases the question as to the extent of
search required of a subsequent purchaser is equally im-
portant. Suppose A, who has no interest in certain land,
purports to convey this land to B and warrants the title
thereto; B records his conveyance; later on A obtains a con-
veyance of the land, records it, and then purports to con-
vey it to C, who pays value and has no knowledge of the
purported transfer to B. Whether the rule that A is not
entitled, as against B, to claim the land after he acquired it
is based upon an estoppel, or upon the equitable doctrine
prevailing in Pennsylvania, the question as to how far C
should extend his search arises. Is C entitled to stop when
he finds a recorded conveyance to his grantor? Is C en-
titled to content himself with examining the records for
transfers only from the time of the making of a convey-
ance to the party whose title he is examining? Suppose
there is a statute in the particular jurisdiction providing
that the after-acquired title of A should pass to B imme-
diately upon acquisition of the land by A; would it make any
difference that this statute was enacted before or after the
recording statute? Such a statute would operate to pass the
after-acquired title to B, and the result would be that A had
no title to pass to C. So if B was careless in taking a con-
veyance from A when A had no interest to transfer, C was
equally as careless in making a purchase at a time when
the only interest which the common grantor had had passed
to B under the operation of the statute or the doctrine of
estoppel. In most jurisdictions a judgment lien is held to
attach to lands acquired by the judgment debtor after the
docketing of the judgment;6" and, accordingly, there must
65 Freeman on Judgments, 4th ed., § 367.
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be the necessity of searching for judgment liens against the
judgment debtor before, as well as after, he acquired the
title. However, in Ford v. Unity Church Society 66 it is
held "that a recorded deed by one who has no title, but
who afterwards acquires the title by recorded deed, is not
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser in good faith
from the common grantor"; that when the subsequent pur-
chaser "searches till he finds the deed by which his grantor
acquires the title, he is not bound to look for deeds made
prior to that time," such deeds being considered as not
in the line of title. The statute referred to in this case
provided that if a person purports to convey the fee to
certain property at a time when he has no interest therein
and later acquires the title to the property, such after-
acquired title shall pass by the conveyance. The decision
seems to thwart the operation of the statute in this class
of cases. It does not seem to be unreasonable to require
one who purchases the property to search the records for
conveyances executed by his grantor before the latter ac-
66 120 Mo. 498, 41 Am. St. Rep. 711 (1894).
"... where A, having no title, executed a mortgage to B, which was recorded,
and then A, after the record of a deed of the premises to himself, conveyed to
C, who was without actual notice of the mortgage, it was held that the record of
the mortgage was notice to C, and that under the recording laws B was entitled
to priority. [Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97 (1874).] If at the time of the mort-
gage to B, and up to that of the conveyance to C, the title had been vested in
A, defective only in that the deed to himself was not recorded, B would have
been 'shipwrecked in the event'; but since his grantor's title, at the date of the
mortgage, was wholly defective instead of partly so, B prevails. This unreasonable
state of the law results from the want of merit in the rule that a purchaser is
not bound to look back of the date of the conveyance to his grantor, as it may
he shown of record; by reason of which the rule is subordinated to the opera-
tion of any other principle, whether of law or equity, that conflicts with it. In
the case stated, it was the duty of C to examine the records for conveyances
from A, and prudence would dictate that while engaged in the examination, it
would be well for him to make it in full. As said by the court of Missouri in
a case [Digman v. McCollum, 47 Mo. 372 (1871).] nearly similar, 'if he had
searched the records as a prudent man should, he must have acquired actual
knowledge of the deed (mortgage), and its contents as shown by the records. If
he neglected this reasonable precautionary search, the consequences of that neglect
he must bear. It would be unjust to visit them upon an innocent third party."'
Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 162.
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quired the title. Would not an abstract that is properly
prepared exhibit the transfers made by the grantor before
he acquired title? If so, a knowledge of such prior trans-
fers could be had with but little inconvenience.
There is a class of cases where a proper search would
have to extend back for a number of years. Where a charge
is created on land by an instrument, such as a will, that is
required to be recorded and is recorded, those who sub-
sequently acquire the property and are obliged to make title
through such prior instrument are required to carry their
examination of the records "back at least twenty years from
the date of search, especially in view of the fact that the
common law presumption of payment does not arise until
the expiration of that period." 67
Recordation of an instrument that is not recordable will
not come within the operation of the statute. It is gen-
erally stated that the record of an instrument that is not
recordable will not operate as notice to those persons pro-
tected by statute against unrecorded transfers. An in-
strument may not be recordable either because of the nature
of the right it creates 18 or because it is not properly exe-
cuted."9 If the instrument is not recordable because of the
nature of the right created by it, and if it is not recorded,
priority as between the holder of the instrument and a sub-
sequent transferee is governed by the rules of the common
law and equity. But if such an instrument is recorded and
a subsequent transferee sees the record of it,70 he cannot be
67 Mathieson v. Craven, 228 Fed. 345, 382 (Dist. Ct., Dist. Del. 1915).
68 Hale v. Pendergrast, 42 Cal. App. 104, 183 Pac. 833 (1919), rehearing
denied by Supreme Court, 183 Pac. 836; Black v. Solano Co., 299 Pac. 843, 845
(Cal. App. 1931); Starz v. Kirsch, 136 N. E. 36 (Ind. 1922).
69 Bell v. Sage, 60 Cal. App. 149, 212 Pac. 404 (1922); Du Ross v. Trainor,
10 Pac. (2d) 763 (Cal. App. 1932).
70 Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 137 Pac. 21 (Cal. 1913); Walters v.
Hartwig, 106 Ind. 123, 6 N. E. 5 (1886); Musick v. Barney, 49 Mo. 458 (1872).
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entitled to rank as a bona fide purchaser. So one may
gain an advantage by the fact of recording an unrecordable
transfer.
A recordable transfer that is not recorded is effective or
valid as between the parties thereto and their heirs and
representatives. Some recording statutes provide that an
unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties there-
to and those who have notice thereof.7 Other statutes pro-
vide that an unrecorded instrument is not valid "as against
any person, except the grantor or lessor, his heirs and de-
visees and persons having actual notice of it." 72 The re-
cording is generally only of importance in preserving a posi-
tion of advantage as against, or giving notice to, certain
persons enumerated by, or within the contemplation of, the
recording statute.
Where the statute prescribes a period of time for the
recording of instruments, two considerations are presented:
first, as to the effect of recording within the time; and
second, as to the effect of recording after the expiration of
the time. The general rule is that where an instrument is
recorded at any time within the statutory period, it relates
back to the date of its delivery and takes precedence over
any transfer executed between the date of execution and the
date of recording, though the second transfer was recorded
before the first." Where the conveyance is recorded after
the time specified it is generally considered as operating
to give notice, or preserve a position of advantage, from the
time of the recording.74 The grantee in the first deed is
not entitled to insist that the recording after the expiration
of the specified period shall relate back to the date of
71 See the California statute.
72 See the Massachusetts statute.
73 Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 132.
74 Op. cit. supra note 73.
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delivery, but he is entitled to the benefit of the record from
the time it is actually made. Where two or more pur-
ported transfers of the same property are made to different
transferees, and neither is recorded within its statutory
time, priority would be determined just as if no period of
time had been prescribed for recording, unless the statute
operates to give priority to the one first recorded.75
Where there is no statutory provision allowing a specified
period of time for recording, a conveyance is generally con-
sidered as operating to give notice, or preserve a position
of advantage, from the time it is recorded.76  In some juris-
dictions the transferee is entitled to a reasonable time with-
in which to record his transfer, and a record made within
such time relates back to the date of execution of the con-
veyance.77
W. D. Rollison.
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(To be continued.)
75 Op. cit. supra note 73. "The prior recording of the prior conveyance at
any time after its execution will give it precedence. So will the prior recording of
the subsequent conveyance give it precedence over a prior one subsequently
recorded, although neither of them be recorded within the five days." Thayer, J.,
in Fleschner v. Sumpter, 6 Pac. 506, 511 (Ore. 1885).
76 Webb, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 131.
77 Op. cit. supra note 76; Goodsell v. Sullivan, 40 Conn. 83 (1873).
